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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robroy Wall, Jr., (hereinafter Mr. Wall) appeals from his convictions for first
degree murder and use of a firearm in the commission of that offense, asserting that the
district court committed reversible instructional error.
Statement of Facts
This case was the subject of a 10 day jury trial, and the issue herein is factually
intensive. While the detailed facts specifically relevant to our issue will be taken from
the trial testimony, what generally happened is that in the early morniilg hours of May 2,
2003, Zachariah Street (hereinafter Zach) was murdered in the desert south of Boise.
There were three defendants involved, Mr. Wall, Jason McDermott, and Daniel Hosford.
They all belonged to a gang called La Familia which was run by McDermott. Zach had
recently been arrested for committing vehicle burglaries, and McDer~nottlearned that
Zach had given names to the police, so McDermott wanted Zach beaten up or itilled.
(PSI, p. 2.)
As to what happened next, while Mr. Wall was acquitted of the charge of
conspiracy to commit first degree murder, the overt acts charged in that offense
nevertheless provide a good timeline of events. The overt acts alleged as follows:
1. On or about the 25th day of April, 2003, Jason McDermott and Daniel
Hosford drove from Boise, Idaho to Pullman, Washingto11 intending to
bring Robroy Wall, Jr. back to Boise to assist in the murder of Zachariah
Street.

2. On or about the 27th day of April, 2003, Jason McDermott, Daniel
Hosford and Robroy Wall, Jr. drove from Pullman, Washington to Boise,
Idaho to participate in the murder of Zachariah Street.

3. On or about the 27th day of April, 2003, Jason McDermott stole a
Ruger 9mm handgun intending to use it to murder Zachariah Street.
4. Robroy Wall, Jr. and Daniel Hosford hid the stolen Ruger 9mm
handgun so that it could be used at a later date to murder Zachariah Street.
5. Prior to the 1st day of May, 2003, Jason McDermott retrieved the stolen
Rnger handgun from its hiding place intending to use it to murder
Zachariah Street.

6. On or about the 1st day of May, 2003, Jason McDermott, Robroy Wall,
Jr. and Daniel Hosford dressed in black clothing and wore gloves in
preparation to murder Zachariah Street.

7. Jason McDermott, Robroy Wall, Jr., and Daniel I-Iosford induced
Zachariah Street to get into a vehicle on May 1, 2003 intending to take
him to a remote spot to murder him.
8. Jason McDermott, Robroy Wall, Jr. and Daniel ~ o s f o r ddrove
Zachariah Street to a remote desert location in Ada County, Idaho, in the
early morning hours of May 2,2003, where they intended to murder him.
9. In the early morning hours of May 2, 2003, at the remote desert
location, Jason McDermott, Robroy Wall, Jr. and Daniel Hosford made
Zachariah Street get out of the vehicle and made him remove articles of
his clothing in preparation to murder him.
10. In the early morning hours of May 2, 2003, at the remote desert
location, Zachariah Street was shot twice in the head with the Ruger 9mm
handgun, from which shots Zachariah Street died.
11. Prior to shooting Zachariah Street, articles of his removed clothing
were placed over his head.
Information, p. 2-3. (R. p. 46-47.)
McDermott fired the first shot into Zach's head after which Mr. Wall took the gun
from McDermott and fired the second shot. (PSI, p. 2.) The forensic pathologist testified
at trial that the sequence of events was that the victim was on his knees, he was shot once,
he fell forward, pants were put over his head, he was shot again, and the body was not
moved; this all happened right where the body was found. (Tr. p. 569.)

The pathologist further testified that while the first shot would have been fatal, the
victim was medically alive at the time of the second shot. (Tr. p. 578-79, 582.) This
opinion was based on the hemorrhagic wound track of the second shot, which showed
that the heart was beating and pumping blood, indicating the person was alive. (Tr. p.
577-78.) However, the first shot, which was through the brain, would have rendered him
immediately unconscious. (Tr. p. 598.) The first shot was not survivable even with
immediate medial attention. (Tr. p. 601.)
According to the pathologist, after the first shot, the victim was not moving.
Instead, he pitched forward, landed on the left side of his face, and stayed there
unconscious and didn't have spasms or writhe on the ground. (Tr. p. 600.) He would
have never moved after falling into the position he ended up in after the first shot, would
have been incapable of speech or co~nmunication,and incapable of any movement,
including his extremities, except that his chest would have been moving since he was still
breathing, but, in essence, pretty still. (Tr. p. 603-04.)
At trial, the primary witness regarding what happened was Daniel Hosford, and
the following is from his testimony. At the time of Mr. Wall's trial, Hosford had pled
guilty to aiding and abetting second degree murder, but had not yet been sentenced. (Tr.
p. 639-640.)
Hosford testified that at the relevant time, McDermott, Mr. Wall, Zach, Renton
McGowan, Mike Bennett, and Robert Key were all involved with a gang-type affiliation
that had been given the name La Familia by McDermott. (Tr. p. 657.) McDermott was in
charge of the gang, and Mr. Wall was second in command. (Tr. p. 701 .)

At the time, Mr. Wall lived in Pullman, Washington, and Hosford lived with
McDermott at his apartment (in Boise). (Tr. p. 660-61, 663.) Other people, including
other members of the gang, stayed on and off at McDermott's apartment, including Zach.
(Tr. p. 663-64.) McDermott went by the name of Junez Miselli, tried to speak with an
Italian accent, and claimed that his uncle was a godfather in the Italian Mafia. (Tr. p. 66465.) Mr. Wall went by the supposed German name of Saragei and tried speaking with a
German accent. (Tr. p. 665-66.)
McDermott would subject the gang members to various tests, some of which,
according to Hosford, involved pain and hurting people. (Tr. p. 721.) For example, they
would have to stand there and talte hits and kicks from McDermott and see how long they
could stand up without falling down. (Tr. p. 721.) McDermott also had a sword which
was really sharp, and he would have them sit down and move the sword really fast
around parts of their body, head, shoulders or whatever. (Tr. p. 722.) He did it a couple
times to Hosford and he never got hurt, but another one of them got a couple cuts on his
back. (Tr. p. 722.)
The gang members were told not to rat on anybody in the group, and if they did,
they would be punished. (Tr. p. 675.) Approximately a month before the murder, Renton
McGowan and Zach were arrested, and McDermott believed that Zach had ratted him
out. (Tr. p. 675-76.)
As to the murder itself, Hosford testified that it occurred in the desert off Pleasant
Valley Road in Boise in the early morning hours of May 2, 2003. (Tr. p. 641-43.)
McDermott was driving, Mr. Wall was in the passenger seat, and Nosford and Zach were
in the back seat. (Tr, p. 643.) When they got to the location, McDermott and Mr. Wall

got out, opened the trunk, and did something for about 15 minutes, after which Nosford
wondered what was going on, so he got out and saw McDermott putting a handgun in the
waistband of his pants. (Tr. p. 643-44.) Hosford believed it to be loaded since he had
earlier seen it and it had a full magazine of bullets, but that night he did not know because
he did not see McDermott put bullets in the gun, all he heard was McDermott say that
"two or three would be enough." (Tr. p. 644.)
McDermott then spoke to Zach who was still in the car, but Zach did not reply or
get out, and then Mr. Wall told him to get out, and he still did nothing. (Tr. p. 645.) Then
Hosford told Zach to get out, and he did. (Tr. p. 645.) Once out, they all walked out into
the desert, probably 100 yards. Then McDermott told Zach to take off his shirt, pants, hat
and shoes. (Tr. p. 646.) Zach did not remove any item of clothing. Mr. Wall then told
him to take off his clothes and he still did nothing. Hosford then told Zach to take off his
clothes and he did, after which he had on his socks and underwear. (Tr. p. 647-48.)
McDermott then told him to get on the ground on his lcnees and put his hands
behind his back, to which Zach asked "are you F-ing serious?" He did not kneel and then
Mr. Wall told him to kneel and he still did not. (Tr. p. 648.) So then Hosford said "Go
ahead, Zach. It's a test." And then Zach kneeled down, crossed his ankles, and put his
hands behind his back. (Tr. p. 649.)
At this point, the gun was still in McDermott's waistband. Mr; Wall mentioned
something about blood splatter and to put the shirt around Zach's head so that blood
would not get on them. McDer~nottthen went over to Zach and piclted up his shirt, and
put it over Zach's head like a shroud so he couldn't see anything. (Tr. p. 649-50.)
McDermott took out the pistol and pulled the slide back to load it. (Tr. p. 650.) I-Ie

cocked the pistol and told Zach that he had reliable information that Zach had ratted him
out, which Zach denied. (Tr. p. 650.) McDe1111ott then put the pistol in different places
around Zach's head and asked him where the gun was, to which Zach answered correctly.
(Tr. p. 651.) Hosford said that at first Zach was upset, but said he wasn't scared, but
then

said

he

was

scared

and

was

upset

and

crying.

(Tr. p. 65 1.)
McDermott said he was loolcing for a certain spot, and when the gun was around
Zach's left temple, he said it was "right there" and pulled the trigger. (Ti-. p. 652.) At the
shot Zach fell forward, and Hosford said he heard the air kind of come out of him. (Tr. p.
652.) IHosford was probably about 15 feet from Zach when McDermott shot him, and
Mr. Wall was around five feet away from IHosford. (Tr. p. 652.) Then, McDermott faced
Hosford and tried to hand him the gun, but Hosford stepped back and told him he didn't
want it. (Tr. p. 652-53.) McDermott urged him, but he again said he didn't want it. At
that time Mr. Wall stepped up and took the gun from McDermott. (Tr. p. 653.)
McDermott mentioned the blood splatter and tried pulling the shirt back over Zach's head
but couldn't, so Mr. Wall took the pants and put them over Zach's head. (Tr. p. 653.) Mr.
Wall then bent down, said "[wlhere do you want it, Brother," and shot Zach in the head.
(Tr. p. 653.) Hosford estimated no more than a minute and a half elapsed between the
shots. (Tr. p. 653.)
IHosford testified that he thought Zach was dead after McDer~nottshot him in the
head. (Tr. p. 756.) It was late at night, dark, there was no artificial light where they were
parked, and they did not have flashlights or anything. (Tr. p. 749-50.)

Hosford testified that after McDermott shot Zach, Mr. Wall didn't really show
any emotion on his face (which he found weird), no sadness, no happiness, but after he
shot Zach, he had a smile on his face and was jumping up and down as if he was happy,
like a crazy happy. (Tr. p. 654.) Mr. Wall then handed McDermott the gun, and they
emhraced each other and kissed each other on the cheek. Then Mr. Wall came up to
Hosford, emhraced him, kissed him on his cheek, and told him if he told anybody, he
would kill him. (Tr. p. 654.) McDermott then came over and did and said the same thing
to Hosford, except he also put the gun barrel up to his head when he said it. (Tr. p. 655.)
After the shooting, they went to another person's house (Cory), and on the way
they decided on the alibi they would use if anyone asked them what happened to Zach.
(Tr. p. 691-692.) At Cory's house Mr. Wall acted like nothing had happened. (Tr. p.
694.) They then went to Jason's apartment, and Mr. Wall went to bed, McDermott played
video games, and Hosford drank alcohol. (Tr. p. 694.)
I-Iosford testified that when they left that night, he thought the options were that
they were going to take Zach out and either heat him up, make him strip down to his
underwear and make him walk hack to Boise, or shoot him. (Tr. p. 685.)

I-Iowever,

Hosford testified that he believed that when they left, they were going to kill him. (Tr. p.
737.) This belief was based on actions of McDermott and Mr. Wall, in that they were not
really listening when Iiosford talked of beating him up. (Tr. p. 685-86.)
It was pointed out that contrary to this testimony, Hosford had told the police he
thought McDermott and Mr. Wall were just going to beat him up and not kill him, and
also, he earlier testified in McDermott's trial that he thought they were just going to scare
him. (Tr, p. 738-39.) His testimony from McDermott's trial was read in the instant case,

and he had testified that his impression when Zach was told to take his clothes off was
that he thought McDermott and Mr. Walls were testing him. (Tr. p. 741.) They had
earlier talked about causing some consequence to Zach for naming names to the police,
and they talked about maybe they should just beat him up and about humiliating him,
such as having him walk from the desert in his underpants. (Tr. p. 741-42.) His further
impression was that Zach thought it was going to be a test also. (Tr. p. 742-43.) Even up
to Zach being on his knees with his clothes off, it was Hosford's impression that Zach
still thought it was part of a test. (Tr. p. 743.) Hosford thought the gun was a prop in the
test so that it was a test Zach would long remember. (Tr. p. 743.) Hosford said that while
he knew when they came back from Pullman that something was going to happen to
Zach, that he might he hurt or even killed, he didn't think they (McDermott and Mr.
Wall) were serious, and they were just there to scare people, and told them so. (Tr. 745.)
Finally, Hosford testified (in Mr. Wall's trial) that even when McDermott was
moving the gun around Zach's head, he still thought it was a test, but at that point he had
more belief that Zach was going to die. (Tr. p. 753.)
Other members of the gang confirmed Hosford's belief that Zach would not be
killed (just scared). Robert Key testified that a week before the murder, he had a
conversation with McDermott who said that Zach and Renton McGowen had to die on a
camping trip because they were snitches. (Tr. p. 1157-58.) After that, Robert Key stole
what would become the murder weapon on the demand of McDerlnott and gave it to him.
(Tr. p. 1159-60.) Robert Key testified that Zach and Renton were his friends. (Tr. p.
1160.) However, he did not take McDermott's threats seriously because he had a big
mouth and thought it was just talk. (Tr. p. 1160, 1164.)

Derek Carter testified that about a week before the murder, McDermott told him
that he was very angry at Zach for being a snitch and that he deserved either a bullet to
the back of the head or to be cut from ear to ear. (Tr. p. 1271-72.) He did not take the
threat seriously because he believed that McDermott was a blowhard and a big talker,
having told many stories about his Mafia connections that he did not believe. (Tr. p.
1273.) He didn't bother to contact Zach and tell him about it because he thought it was
just more puffery on the part of McDermott. (Tr. p. 1273-74.)
Renton McGowan testified consistently with Hosford that McDermott affected an
Italian accent at times and claimed he was with the Mafia. (Tr. p. I I I I .) According to
Renton, McDermott claimed he had $30,000,000, military experience, diplomatic
immunity, and a lot of friends in the high ranks of the Mafia. (Tr. p. 1123.) It was
McDermott who ran La Familia in Boise, gave the orders, and gave people tests. (Tr. p.
1122.) Renton received one test from McDermott, he was told he had to join the gang
and he had to commit a crime in order to be initiated. (Tr. p. 1122-23.)
Finally, Mr. Wall had been interrogated by police on two occasions which were
videotaped. The jurors were provided with a transcript (court's exhibits to the record) to
read along with as the video was played, but the transcripts were not entered into
evidence. (Tr. p. 1249, 1252.) Of significance was Mr. Wall's statement that he didn't
think Zach was alive after McDermott shot him. (Court's exhibit 1, p. 18, In. 726-728.)
He also said that he didn't know that Zach had been shot twice until the police told him.
(Court's exhibit 2, p. 9, ins. 344-345.) This is because he did not want to shoot him even
if he was dead, but wanted it to look like he was because they were watching him. So he

tried to shoot into the ground and thought that they couldn't see because it was dark.
(Court's exhibit 1, p. 18, ins. 735-738; Court's exhibit 2, p. 8, In. 341-p.

9, In. 343.)

Also, Mr. Wall said in regard to McDermott talking about taking Zach out and
killing him, that he "thought he was full of sh-t," he didn't think McDermott was going
to kill Zach, but just scare him. (Court's exhibit 1, p. 21, Ins. 877-880.) He did not think
McDermott was serious because he had said he was going to Itill people before, but he
never went through with it, and he was all talk. (Court's exhibit 2, p. 6, ins. 233-239.)
Mr. Wall repeatedly said that he really didn't think McDennott would do it, and his belief
was based on his previous experiences with McDermott where he did similar things but
never pulled the trigger, he just was scaring people. (Court's exhibit 2, p. 8, Ins. 3003 18.) He also repeatedly said that he was just playing along (including about the blood
splatter). (Court's exhibit 2, p. 3, 7, & 8.) At the scene, he decided to still play along and
thought that when it came down to it, McDermott would just uncock the pistol and tell
Zach to put on his clothes and then they would leave, like he had always done. (Court's
exhibit, p. 8, Ins. 316-318.)
A detective was asked about a portion of the interview and testified in response to
a question about why Mr. Wall was laughing and smiling and stuff when this happened,
that his answer was that he was trying to hide the fact that he was kind of scared. (Tr. p.
1372-73.) In the interview this was further explained as him being afraid of getting shot
himself if McDermott saw he was nervous and thought that Mr. Wall might rat him out.
(Court's exhibit 1 , p. 23, Ins. 957-959.)

Course of Proceedings
Mr. Wall, Jason McDermott, and Daniel Hosford were charged with Conspiracy
to Co~nmitMurder in the First Degree, Murder in the First Degree, and Use of Firearm
During the Commission of a Crime. (R, p. 45-48.) The state filed a notice of intent to
seek the death penalty against Mr. Wall and McDermott. While the state much later
withdrew the notice of intent to seek the death penalty as to Mr. Wall, until that time
much litigation ensued related to it, none of which is relevant at this time since the state
ultimately did not seek the death penalty against him.'
The co-defendants' trials were severed, and McDermott was tried first. (R. p.
174.) The jury found McDermott guilty as charged, but was unable to reach a unanimous
decision on the statutory aggravating circumstances that would have triggered the death
penalty as to McDertnott. After this, the state withdrew its notice of intent to seek the
death penalty as to Mr. Wall. (R. p. 356-357,360, 363.)
Mr. Wall proceeded to jury trial and was convicted of first degree murder and use
of a firearm in the commission of a crime, but was acquitted of conspiracy to commit first
degree murder. (R. p. 448-449.) He was sentenced to life in prison with the first 25 years
fixed for murder, and 5 years fixed for use of a firearm to run concurrent. (R. p. 464.)
McDermott was sentenced to two fixed life sentences and a consecutive 10 year
fixed sentence for the firearm. (R. p. 482.) Hosford, who had pled guilty to second
degree murder, received 10 years fixed and 5 years indeterminate. (R. p. 482.)

The notice and its later withdrawal were not included in the clerk's record for unknown
reasons, but their omission is not important to the issue on appeal.
I

Mr. Wall filed a timely notice of appeal. (R. p. 467-470.) He also brought a Rule
35 motion, which the district court denied. (R. p. 479-480, 481-483.)

Whether the court committed reversible instructional error when after the
jury had begun its deliberations and over objection of the parties, it sua

sponte changed the transitional verdict form regarding 1'' and 2"d degree
murder to one misstating the law and contradicting the other instructions,
which allowed for conviction on IS' degree murder without the jury having
found the defendant guilty of murder.

ARGUMENT
THE COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE INSTRUCTIONAL ERROR WHEN
AFTER DELIBERATIONS HAD BEGUN IT SUA SPONTE CHANGED THE
TRANSITIONAL VERDICT FORM REGARDING lStand 2ndDEGREE MURDER TO
ONE MISSTATING THE LAW AND CONTRADICTING THE OTHER
INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH ALLOWED FOR CONVICTION ON 1

DEGREE

MURDER WITHOUT THE DEFENDANT HAVING BEEN FOUND GUILTY OF
MURDER

A.

Introduction
Here, the jury instructions (and transitional verdict form), followed the Idaho

pattern inshuctions and first required the jury to determine whether Mr. Wall was guilty
of murder and then to decide whether the state had proven the special circumstance which
would establish first degree murder. After the case had gone to the jury, the court sua

sponte and over the objection of both parties, halted the jury's deliberations and changed
the transitional verdict form to require the jury to first decide whether Mr. Wall was
guilty of first degree murder and if not, then to decide whether he was guilty of what the
court called the lesser included offense of second degree murder.
Appellant asserts that the court was incorrect about the order in which the jury's
decisions for a charge of murder are structured, and that the court's new transitional
verdict form was misstatement of law because it was contrary to the presumptively
correct Idaho pattern instructions. Regardless, it contradicted the elements instructions
already given.

Appellant further asserts that his due process rights and right to a jury trial under
the 5lh, 6th , and 1 4 ' ~Amendments were violated. The new transitional verdict form in
effect directed the verdict for the state on the offense of murder and allowed the jury to
find him guilty of first degree murder without every having found him guilty of murder.
This is because the jury was directed to first decide whether he committed first degree
murder, not murder, and the first degree murder instruction presupposes a murder had
been committed. Even if the jury found the special circumstances for first degree murder,
it does not establish there was a murder to begin with. Then, according to the verdict
form, once the jury found him guilty of first degree murder, it moves on to whether he
used a firearm, and never decides whether he had committed the underlying murder.
Appellant also asserts that the manner in which the court changed the transitional
verdict form was error, to wit, over objection of both parties and by interrupting the
deliberations and giving the new verdict form after closing arguments which were based
on the original verdict form which was consistent with the elements instructions.
Finally, Appellant asserts that the error is reversible. First, the directing of the
verdict for the state on the charge of murder is per se reversible. However, the other
errors are not harmless because it simply cannot be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt
that the error(s) had no effect on the verdict. This is shown by the length of the
deliberations both before and after the change in the verdict form, the other jury verdicts
on the other counts, and the evidence (and defenses), which those other verdicts show
was otherwise insufficient to support a murder conviction, much less a first degree
murder conviction.

These factors show that it cannot be concluded that the jury would have convicted
Mr. Wall of even secolld degree murder had it considered that charge first, even though it
convicted him of first degree murder once it was given the new verdict form which
implicitly or explicitly told the jury that Mr. Wall had committed murder.
Further, the instructional error may have caused other problems as well. For
example, the irreconcilable and contradictory instructions certainly advised the jury that it
really did not need to follow all the instructions. Finally, the suspect timing of the guilty
verdict in relation to the change in verdict form suggests that it acted as a prohibited
dynamite instruction.

B.

Applicable law and standards of review
As explained by the United States Supreme Court in UnitedStates v. Gaudin, 5 I5

U.S. 506, 115 S.Ct. 2310 (1995):
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that
no one will be deprived of liberty without "due process of law"; and the
Sixth, that "[iln all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury." We have held that
these provisions require criminal convictions to rest upon a jury
determination that the defendant is guilty of every element of the crime
with which he is charged, beyond a reasonable doubt. Sullivan v
Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277-278, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 2080-2081, 124
L.Ed.2d 182 (1 993).
Id., 509-510 (footnote omitted).

As stated in Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277, 113 S.Ct. 2078,
2080 (1993): "Thus, although a judge may direct a verdict for the defendant if the
evidence is legally insufficient to establish guilt, he may not direct a verdict for the State,
no matter how overwhelming the evidence."

The United States Supreme Court also held in Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1,
15, 119 S.Ct. 1827 (1999), that a harmless error analysis may be applied when a court
omits an essential element from the instructions to the jury.
Under Idaho law, the standards for reviewing instructional errors are as explained
in State v. Nevarez, 142 Idaho 616, 130 P.3d 1154 (Ct.App. 2005):
Whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over
which we exercise free review. When reviewing jury instructions, we ask
whether the instructioils as a whole, and not individually, fairly and
accurately reflect applicable law.

Id. p. 619 (internal citations omitted). Nevavez further explained:
If contradictory jury instructions are given on a material issue, the error is
prejudicial, for an error in one instruction cannot be cured by reference to
a correct statement of the law in another.

Id.
Where a harmless error analysis applies to a jury instruction question, Idaho
Appellate courts have followed Neder, as explained in State v. Thompson, 143 Idaho 155,

The deterinination of error in the jury instructions does not end our inquiry
where, as here, the state argues that the error was harmless. To constitute
error entitling a defendant to relief, an instruction must mislead the jury or
prejudice the defendant. Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance that
does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded. I.C.R. 52. A
harmless error analysis may be applied when a court omits an essential
element from the instructions to the jury. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S.
1, 15, 119 S.Ct. 1827, 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999); State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho
73, 79, 90 P.3d 298, 304 (2004). In cases where the improper instruction
did not vitiate all the jury's findings, the United States Supreme Court has
"recognized that improperly omitting an element from the jury can easily
be analogized to iinproperly instructing the jury on an element of the
offense, an error which is subject to harmless-error analysis." Neder, 527
U.S. at 10-1 1, 119 S.Ct. 1827; State v. Peteja, 139 Idaho 607,613, 83 P.3d
781, 787 (Ct.App.2003). See, e.g., Slate v. Lilly, 142 Idaho 70, 72, 122
P.3d 1170, 1172 (Ct.App.2005) (instruction submitted to the jury resulted

in the omission of an element by effectively canceling out the essential
element given in another instruction).
The error at issue here, as in Neder, is simply an error in the trial process,
not a structural error defying harmless-error review by "affecting the
framework within which the trial proceeds." Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119
S.Ct. 1827. Our inquiry is not "whether, in a trial that occurred without the
error, a guilty verdict would surely have been rendered, but whether the
guilty verdict actually rendered in this trial was surely unattributable to the
error." Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 279, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124
L.Ed.2d 182 (1993). The government bears the burden of showing that the
error had no effect on a defendant's substantial rights. Lilly, 142 Idaho at
72, 122 P.3d at 1172. If, after examining the record, the reviewing court
"cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would
have been the same absent the error ... it should not find the error
harmless." Neder, 527 U.S. at 19, 119 S.Q. 1827. Thus, the error is
reversible where a jury is not instrncted as to an element of an offense and
the record contains evidence that could rationally lead to a finding in favor
of the defendant with respect to the omitted element.
Id., p. 157-158 (internal citations omitted)
However, harmless error review does not apply to all instructional error. For
example, Sullivan, supra, held that it does not apply to a deficient reasonable doubt
instruction, a holding which Idaho has followed in State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,
282, 77 P.3d 956, 971 (2003). Nor, as suggested by the United States Supreme Court in

Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 106 S.Ct. 3101 (1986), would it apply to a directed verdict
for the state:

. . . harmless-error analysis presumably would not apply if a court directed
a verdict for the prosecution in a criminal trial by jury. We have stated that
"a trial judge is prohibited from entering a judgment of conviction or
directing the jury to come forward with such a verdict ... regardless of how
overwhelmingly the cvidence may point in that direction." This rule stems
from the Sixth Amendment's clear command to afford jury trials in serious
criminal cases. Where that right is altogether denied, the State cannot
contend that the deprivation was harmless because the evidence
established the defendant's guilt; the error in such a case is that the wrong
entity judged the defendant guilty.
Id., p. 578 (internal citations omitted).

C.

The jury instructions and verdict forms
The relevant jury instructions given by the court (without objection by the parties)

were as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 17
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Murder, the state must prove
each of the following:

1.

2.
3.
4.

5,

On or about May 2,2003
in the state of Idaho
the defendant Robroy Wall, Jr. engaged in conduct which
caused the death of Zachariah Street,
the defendant acted without justification or excuse, and
with malice aforethought.

If you find that the state has failed to prove any of the above, then you
must find the defendant not guilty of murder. If you find that all of the
above have been proven beyond a reasonable doubt then you must find the
defendant guilty of murder and decide if the defendant is guilty of first
degree murder.
INSTRUCTION NO. 18
Murder is the killing of a human being without legal justification or
excuse and with malice aforethought.
The killing of a human being is legally justified or excused when "done in
self-defense". There is no evidence of "self-defense" in this case.
INSTRUCTION NO. 19
Malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is manifested a
deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow creature. It
is implied when no considerable provocation appears, or when the
circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and malignant
heart.
INSTRUCTION NO. 20
In order for the defendant to be guilty of First Degree Murder, the state
must prove that the murder:

was a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing.
Premeditation means to consider beforehand whether to ltill
or not to kill, and then to decide to kill. There does not have
to be any appreciable period of time during which the
decision to kill was considered, as long as it was reflected
upon before the decision was made. A mere unconsidered
and rash impulse, even though it includes an intent to kill,
is not premeditation.
If you unanimously agree that the state has proven the above spccial
circumstance beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendallt
guilty of first degree murder. If you unanimously agree that the special
circumstance has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you must
find the defendant guilty of second degrec murder.
All other murder is murder of the second degree.
INSTRUCTION NO. 21
An act is "willful" or done "willfully" when done on purpose. One can act
willfully without intending to violate the law,
INSTRUCTION NO. 22
The law makes no distinction between a person who directly participates
in the acts constituting a crime and a person who, either before or during
its commission, intentionally aids, assists, facilitates, promotes,
encourages, counsels, solicits, invites, helps or hires another to commit a
crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission. Both can be
found guilty of the crime. Mere presence at, acquiescence in, or silent
consent to, the planning or commissioil of a crime is not in the absence of
a duty to act sufficient to make one an accomplice.
INSTRUCTION NO. 23
All persons who participate in a crime either before or during its
commission, by intentionally aiding and abetting another to commit the
crime with intent to promote or assist in its commission are guilty of the
crime. All such participants are considered principals in the commission of
the crime. The participation of a defendant in the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt.
Coui-t's instructions. (Exhibit to record)

The court then gave voluntary and involuntary manslaughter instructions. Next
came the conspiracy to commit first degree murder instructions. While Mr. Wall was
acquitted of this charge, the conspiracy instructions follow since the acquittal itself is
relevant as will be explained below.
INSTRUCTION NO. 29
The crime of Conspiracy involves an agreement by two or more persons to
commit a crime. They need not agree upon every detail. The agreement
may be established in any manner sufficient to show an understanding of
the parties to the agreement. It may be shown by evidence of an oral or
written agreement, or may be implied from the conduct of the parties.
INSTRUCTION NO. 30
All of the parties to a conspiracy need not enter into the agreement at the
same time. A person who later joins an already formed conspiracy with
knowledge of its unlawful purpose is a party to the conspiracy.
INSTRUCTION NO. 31
The defendant is not guilty of Conspiracy if the defendant in good faith
withdrew by informing another party to the conspiracy of the defendant's
withdrawal before any party performed an act for the purpose of carrying
out the agreement.
INSTRUCTION NO. 32
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Conspiracy to Commit First
Degree Murder, the state must prove each of the following:
1. On or about April 25,2003 through May 2,2003
2. in the state of Idaho, and elsewhere
3. the defendant Robroy Wall, Jr. and Jason McDermott, and
Daniel Earl Hosford agreed
4. to commit the crime of first degree murder
5. the defendant intended that the crime of first degree murder
would be committed,
6. one or more of the parties to the agreement performed at
least one of the following acts for the purpose of carrying
out the agreement:

a. On or about the 25th day of April, 2003, Jason
McDermott and Daniel Hosford drove from Boise, Idaho to

Pullman, Washington intending to bring Robroy Wall, Jr
back to Boise to assist in the murder of Zachariah Street.
b. On or about the 27th day of April, 2003, Jason
McDermott, Daniel Hosford and Robroy Wall, Jr. drove
from Pullman, Washington to Boise, Idaho to participate in
the murder of Zachariah Street.
c. On or about the 27th day of April, 2003, Jason
McDermott stole a Ruger 9mm handgun intending to use it
to murder Zachariah Street.
d. Robroy Wall, Jr. and Daniel I-Iosford hid the stolen
Ruger 9mm handgun so that it could be used at a later date
to murder Zachariah Street.
e. Prior to the 1st day of May, 2003, Jason McDermott
retrieved the stolen Ruger handgun from its hiding place
intending to use it to murder Zachariah Street.
f. On or about the 1st day of May, 2003, Jason McDermott,
Robroy Wall, Jr. and Daniel Hosford dressed in black
clothing and wore gloves in preparation to murder
Zachariah Street.
g. Jason McDermott, Robroy Wall, Jr., and Daniel Hosford
induced Zachariah Street to get into a vehicle on May 1,
2003 intending to take hiin to a remote spot to murder him.
h. In the early morning hours of May 2,2003, at the remote
desert location, Jason McDermott, Robroy Wall, Jr. and
Daniel I-Iosford made Zachariah Street get out of the
vehicle and made him remove articles of his clothing in
preparation to murder him.
i. In the early morning hours of May 2,2003, at the remote
desert location, Zachariah Street was shot twice in the head
with the Ruger 9mm handgun, from which shots Zachariah
Street died.
j. Prior to shooting Zachariah Street, articles of his removed
clothing were placed over his head.

If elements 1 through 5 and at least one of the overt acts in element 6 has
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find the defendant

guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Otherwise you must
find the defendant not guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree murder
Court's Instructions. (Exhibit to record.)
The jury was also instructed as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 36
In every crime or public offense there must exist a union or joint operation
of act and intent.
Court's Instructions. (Exhibit to record.)
The original instruction describing the verdict forin was as follows:
INSTRUCTION NO. 40
In this case you will return a verdict, consisting of a series of questions.
Although the explanations on the verdict form are self explanatory, they
are part of my instructions to you. I will now read the verdict form to you.
It states:
"We, the Jury, for our verdict, unanimously answer the questions
submitted to us as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Is Robroy Wall, Jr. guilty or not guilty of Murder?
Not Guilty
Guilty
if you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty", then answer
Question No. 2. If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Not
Guilty", then proceed to Question No. 3.

QUESTION NO. 2: Is Robroy Wall, Jr. guilty or not guilty of First
Degree Murder?
Not Guilty
Guilty
Please proceed to answer Questioil No. 5.
QUESTION NO. 3: Is Robroy Wall, Jr. guilty or not guilty of Voluntary
Mai~slaughter?
Not Guilty
Guilty
If you unanimously answered Question No. 3 "Guilty" then answer
Question No. 5. If you unanimously answered Question No. 3 "Not
Guilty" then answer Question No. 4.

QUESTION NO. 4: Is Robroy Wall, Jr. guilty or not guilty of Involuntary
Manslaughter by negligent use of a firearm?
Not Guilty
Guilty
If you unani~nously answered Question No. 4 "Guilty" then answer
Question No. 5. If you unanimously answered Question No. 4 "Not
Guilty" then answer Question 6.

QUESTION NO. 5: Did Robroy Wall, Jr. personally use a firearm in the
commission of any crime of which you have found him guilty in
Questions 1 through 4?
YesNo Please now answer Question No. 6.

QUESTION NO. 6: Is Robroy Wall, Jr. guilty or not guilty of Conspiracy
to Commit First Degree Murder?
Not Guilty
Guilty
The verdict form then has a place for it to be dated and signed. You should
sign the verdict form as explained in another instruction.
Court's exhibit 43.
The body of the actual verdict form was identical to the body of Instruction No.
40, above. (Court's exhibit 42.)
The day after the jury was given the case, the court met with counsel outside the
presence of the jury and advised that it thought the verdict form was incorrect as a matter
of law. (Tr. p. 1466, 1470.) The court stated that the first question was whether the
defendant was guilty of what it called the lesser included offense of murder and then the
second question is whether it was first degree murder, whereas the first question should
have been whether it was first degree murder. (Tr. p. 1466.) The court stated that since
no verdict had been rendered yet, that it was going to correct the verdict form. (Tr. p.
1467.) The court acknowledged that neither side wanted the court to do this. (Tr. p.

In response, the prosecutor first argued that the verdict form was not incorrect
and was structured to follow the instructions. (Tr. p. 1468.) He further stated that he did
not want the court to change anything because that would interrupt the deliberations
process and also, he would have argued the case differently to the jury had the verdict
form been different. (Tr. p. 1468.)
The defense objected because they did not know that there was any proble~nwith
the jury at that point. (Tr. p. 1469.) The defense pointed out that the jury had been out
approximately 11 hours and 15 minutes, but that this is a serious case and that is not an
unusually long deliberation. (Tr. p. 1469.) Defense counsel asked that the verdict form
not be changed and noted that it worked fine in McDermott's case. (Tr. p. 1469.)
The court voiced its concern, which is what happens if the jury finds the
defendant guilty of second degree murder but then is deadlocked on whether it is first
degree murder and is the state entitled to a mistrial because of the deadlock on the crime
charged? But the jury does not reach a lesser included offense until it makes a decision
on the crime charged. (Tr. p. 1470.) The court then stated that it told the jury to stop
deliberating until it could make a decision on the matter. Defense counsel objected,
arguing that the court does not have the right to interrupt the jury's deliberations and it is
not fair to change the ground rules. (Tr. p. 1471.) The court overruled the objection
stating it was not changing any rules but was just correcting an error in the instructions.
(Tr. p. 1472.)
The court explained that it was going to substitute a new Instruction No. 40 into
the jurors' packets and would read the new Instruction No. 40 to then1 and tell them the
previous No. 40 had been deleted and give them the new verdict form. (Tr. p. 1471.) The

court brought the jury in and read the instruction. (Tr. p. 1472-74.) The court also
marked the original Instruction No. 40 as Court's exhibit 43 and the original verdict as
Court's exhibit 42. (Tr. p. 1474-75.)
The new Instruction No. 40 provided as follows in relevant part:
INSTRUCTION NO. 40
In this case you will return a verdict, consisting of a series of questions.
Although the explanations on the verdict form are self explanatory, they
are part of my instructions to you. I will now read the verdict form to you.
It states:
"We, the Jury, for our verdict, unanilnously answer the questions
submitted to us as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Is Robroy Wall, Jr. guilty or not guilty of First
Degree Murder?
Not Guilty
Guilty
If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty", then answer
Question No. 5. If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Not
Guilty", then proceed to Question No. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Is Robroy Wall, Jr. guilty or not guilty of Second
Degree Murder?
Not Guilty
Guilty
If you unanimously answered Question No. 2 "Guilty", then answer
Question No. 5. If you unanimously answered Question No. 2 "Not
Guilty", then proceed to Question No. 3.
QUESTION NO. 3: Is Robroy Wall, Jr. guilty or not guilty of Voluntary
Manslaughter?
Not Guilty
Guilty
If you unanimously answered Question No. 3 "Guilty" then answer
Question No. 5. If you unanimously answered Question No. 3 "Not
Guilty" then answer Question No. 4.
QUESTION NO. 4: Is Robroy Wall, Jr. guilty or not guilty of I~lvoluntary
Manslaughter by negligent use of a firearm?
Not Guilty
Guilty

If you unanimously answered Question No. 4 "Guilty" then answer
Question No. 5. If you unanilnously answered Question No. 4 "Not
Guilty" then answer Question 6.

QUESTION NO. 5: Did Robroy Wall, Jr. personally use a firearm in the
con~mission of any crime of which you have found him guilty in
Questions 1 through 4?
YesNo Please now answer Question No. 6.

QUESTION NO. 6: Is Robroy Wall, Jr. guilty or not guilty of Conspiracy
to Commit First Degree Murder?
Not Guilty
Guilty
19
The verdict form then has a piace for it to be dated and signed. You should
sign the verdict form as explained in another instruction.
Court's Instruction No. 40. (Exhibit to record)
The body of the actual verdict form was again identical to the body of the
instruction describing the verdict form. (R. p. 448-49.)

D.

The court erred by chanrrine the transitional verdict form mid-deliberations
Appellant asserts that the district court committed multiple errors by changing the

transitional verdict form, particularly in the manner in which it did. First of all, the new
verdict form was a misstatement of the law and constituted instructional error. Of course,
the error was not limited to the verdict form itself, since as stated in Instruction No. 40
describing it, the verdict form is part of the instructions themselves.
The district court's conceptual premise about the relationship between first and
second degree murder was contrary to how it now exists under Idaho law. In short,
second degree murder is not treated as a lesser included offense of first degree murder but

rather, the base offense is second degree murder which may be enhanced, so to speak, by
the finding of a special circumstance which would make it first degree murder.
According to the statute, murder is the unlawful lcilling of a human being with
malice aforethought. I.C.

5 18-4001. A different statute provides that there are two

degrees of murder. I.C. § 18-4003. If one of various listed circumstances are present
(here, a willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing), it is first degree murder, otherwise,
it is second degree murder. Id.
In Idaho, at least at this time, the degrees of murder are treated differently than are
greater and lesser included offenses, where the defendant is required to be acquitted of
the greater offense before the lesser offense is considered. Instead, in the case of murder,
the jury is instructed to first determine whether the defendant is guilty of (second degree)
murder, and if so, to then decide whether the defendant is guilty of first degree murder.
This structure is called for by the pattern Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, and was
followed in this case.2 (ICJI 704; Court's Instruction 17.)
This structure is continued by the pattern first degree murder instruction (which
was again followed in our case). This instructs the jury that if it does not unanimously
find the special circumstance which would establish first degree murder, it must find the
defendant guilty of second degree murder. (ICJI 705, Court's Instruction 20.)
Significantly, it does not instruct the jury that it should then consider whether he is guilty
of second degree murder or not.
As explained in Slate v. Ruel, 141 Idaho 600, 114 P.3d 158 (Ct.App. 2005):

While the current version of the pattern jury instructions had not been adopted until
shortly after the instant trial, the murder and first degree murder instructions from the
prior version were the same.

The pattern ICJI instructions are presumptively correct. The Idaho
Supreme Court approved the pattern jury instructions and has
recommended that the trial courts use the instructions unless a different
instruction would more adequately, accurately, or clearly state the law. Id.

Id. p. 602 (internal citations omitted).
So in our case, the district court provided the correct elements instructions and at
first the correct transitional verdict form which followed those instructions. However, it
then strayed from the pattern instructions when it gave the new transitional verdict form,
which was error because it not only did not more clearly state the law, it affirmatively
misstated it.
Further, the new transitional verdict form resulted in the court giving inconsistent
and contradictory instructions to the jury, where one requires the jury to first decide
whether the defendant is guilty of (second degree) murder and another requires it to first
decide whether he is guilty of first degree murder. Again, as explained by Nevurez,

supra, 142 Idaho at p. 619: "If contradictory jury instructions are given on a material
issue, the error is prejudicial, for an error in one instruction cannot be cured by reference
to a correct statement of the law in another." Nevarez later stated:
As we explained in State v. Andrus, "[wle have considerable faith in
juries, but we cannot expect them to discern the correct implications
necessary to reconcile contradictory instructions given by the court, all of
which are expected to be given equal weight." Andrus, 118 Idaho 71 1,
716, 800 P.2d 107, 112 (Ct.App.1990).

Id., 142 Idaho at p. 622.
Of course, the contradictory instructions problem exists regardless of whether the
district court was right or wrong about the structure of the instructions. Assuming

arguendo that the district court was correct and first degree murder had to be considered
first, it would have needed to also change the elements instructions and not just the

verdict form. However, the court did not do so, and so it remedied only half of the
problem it perceived, which did nothing but ensure juror collfusion by providing
contradictory instructions.
'The biggest problem with the court's new transitional verdict form is that it
directed the verdict of murder in favor of the state and allowed Mr. Wall to be found
guilty of first degree murder without the jury ever having to determine whether he was
guilty of murder. Since the new verdict form required the jury to first determine, not if
Mr. Wall was guilty of murder, but whether he was guilty of first degree murder, the first
degree murder instruction (No. 20) would have first come into play. That instruction
begins by stating that "[iln order for the defendant to be guilty of First Degree Murder,
the state must prove that the murder: was . . . ."

Then, the last portion of that instruction

agree that the special circumstance has not been proven
provides: "If you una~~imously
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty of second degree murder."
In short, the first degree murder instruction presupposes that a murder has been
committed and does not determine itself whether there was a murder or not. While the
instruction determines in our case whether the killing was willful, deliberate, and
premeditated, it does not determine whether that killing was murder to begin with, for
example, there is no determination regarding malice or justification. In other words, just
because the special circumstances in the instruction are found, it does not establish a
murder, for example, a police shooting can be a willful, deliberate, and premeditated
killing without it being murder.
Then, if the jury finds the special circumstances and so finds Mr. Wall guilty of
first degree murder, according to the new transitional verdict form, it moves on to

whether he used a firearm. Thus, the jury never considers whether he had committed
(second degree) murder.
So here, by following this instruction, the jury would have found Mr. Wall guilty
of first degree murder without ever having found him guilty of murder to begin with.
Appellant asserts that as explained by the cases described above, this violates his right to
due process and his right to a jury trial guaranteed by the 51h,6"', and 141hAmendments to
the United States Constitution in that the jury was not required to find him guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt on every element of the offense, and the court directed the verdict of
murder against him.
Moreover, Appellant asserts that the manner in which the district court changed
the verdict form constituted both an abuse of its discretion as well as a violation of his
~ explained above, over both
due process rights under the 51h and 1 4 ' ~~ m e n d m e n t s . As
parties' objections, the cour! interrupted the jury's deliberations and changed the
transitional verdict form mid-deliberations, after the parties had already made their
closing arguments based on the original transitional verdict form which was consistent
with the elements instructions.
While it is of course much worse that the court changed a correct statement of law
to an incorrect one on the transitional verdict form, even if the court was correct about

Appellant asserts that this is an abuse of discretion under state law by analogy to the
somewhat similar situation of a district court's discretionary decision whether or not to
give further instructions in response to jurors' questions. State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho
267,282,77 P.3d 956, 971 (2003). As to the due process violation, Appellant asserts that
a defendant has a due process right to rely on rulings by the court and to expect that they
will not he changed without a change of circumstances. See, DuPont v. Southern Nal.
Bank qf Houston, 771 F.2d 874, 880 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding a due process violation
where the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss but then later granted the
plaintiffs motion for partial judgment).

the structure, it still should not have changed it at that time. Again, the parties did not
want any change at that point, particularly since they would not be rearguing the case
consistent with the new order in which the decisions were to be made according to the
verdict form, or, more to the point, without an opportunity to attempt to explain to the
jury bow to reconcile the now irreconcilable instructions on how it is to make a decision.
Significantly, the concern which lead to the court malting the change was
unfounded. The court's concern was for the state and whether a retrial would be
permissible if the jury found second degree murder but deadlocked on first degree
murder.

Appellant 'opines there would be no double jeopardy bar under these

circumstances, and it appears that the state came to the same conclusion, or, in any event,
was willing to take that risk. In short, since the party affected by the potential problem
was willing to take its chances that it is correct about the law and let the jury finish its
deliberations undisturbed by any changes, the court should have let it and not have
changed the verdict over everyone's objections.

E.

The error is reversible
Appellant asserts that the various errors discussed above are reversible. First, for

the reasons explained in Rose v. Clark, supra, the court's error in directing the verdict on
the murder charge is per se reversible and not subject to harmless error review regardless
of the evidence which might support the conviction. Given the new transitional verdict
form and structure of the first degree murder instruction, it was the court that in effect
determined that Mr. Wall was guilty of murder when it directed the jury to first decide

whether he was guilty of first degree murder. Then, the error continued into the first
degree murder conviction since it was based on the underlying murder.
However, assuming urguendo that the error is not considered to one of a directed
verdict, but that the jury did not decide every element of the offense, then a harmless
error analysis would apply. This would also be the case for the other errors, such as the
transitional verdict instruction misstating the law, the instructions being contradictory to
each other and so prejudicial, as well as the error in the manner in which the verdict form
was changed. Appellant asserts that these errors are not harmless, whether they are
considered individual or collectively, because a review of the record shows that it cannot
be concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury verdict would have been the same
without them.
To explain, the state pursued two theories of liability for the first degree murder
charge, to wit, aiding and abetting the shooting by McDermott, and Mr. Wall personally
shooting Zach. Given the verdicts, it appears that the jury convicted him based on his
personally shooting Zach and not because he aided and abetted McDermott.
The jury found that Mr. Wall personally used a firearm in the commission of the
crime of first degree murder, which obviously refers to Mr. Wall shooting Zach. On the
other hand, while of course not identical to the aiding and abetting theory, the jury
acquitted Mr. Wall of the other charge in which he could be held vicariously liable, lo

wit, conspiracy to commit first degree murder. This strongly suggests that the jury was
not finding him vicariously liable for the murder based
This

result

would be consistent with
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the actions of McDermott.

the evidence of the various witnesses

(including I-Iosford's earlier testimony and Mr. Wall's statements to the police), that no
one really believed McDermott was going to kill Zach andlor it was just a test. It is even
of McDermott moving the gun around Zach's head, which
supported by the descriptio~~
was eerily similar to the sword test which did not result in death. In short, if Mr. Wall
didn't think McDermott was serious about the murder and was just playing along, he
would have lacked the intent to promote or assist in its commission.
As to Mr. Wall personally shooting Zach, there was definitely insufficient
evidence to convict Mr. Wall of first or second degree murder. The consistent and
uncontroverted evidence is that Mr. Wall thought that Zach was already dead. He told
the police so, Hosford thought so, and this belief was supported by the medical evidence.
The medical examiner testified that Zach would not have been moving after McDermott
shot him, except for his chest since he was still breathing. But he had fallen forward and
so his chest was on the ground, and more importantly, it was dark. There was simply no
evidence before the jury to support the notion that Mr. Wall thought he was shooting into
a live person and not a dead body and so there was a complete failure of evidence which
would establish all of the elements of murder.
Murder requires malice, which was missing here since there was no evidence that
Mr. Wall thought he was killing someone. Of course there was no express malice since
there cannot be an express intention to kill someone it is believed is already dead.
Likewise as to implied malice, since the circumstances attending the killing showed Mr.

Wall did not think it was a killing, it could not be a killing done without considerable
provocatioll or with an abandoned and malignant heart.4
Thus, the evidence in our case was insufficient to support a conviction for (second
degree) murder. For the same reasons, it was of course insufficient to support a
conviction for first degree murder, because if Mr. Wall did not know he was lcilling
someone, that killing certainly could not have been willful, deliberate, and premeditated.
Of course despite this, the jury did convict Mr. Wall of first degree murder, which is
where Appellant asserts the instructional error and confusion it rendered comes in.
As explained above, when the court changed the transitional verdict instruction, it
would have directed the jury to the first degree murder instruction.

Again, this

instruction presupposes that a murder has been committed, which explicitly told the jury
that Mr. Wall was guilty of murder.

Further, the manner in which the change would

have come across to the jury must be considered. While deliberating, it was told to stop in
its efforts to decide whether Mr. Wall had committed (second degree) murder and instead
to look at first degree murder. This impliedly told the jury that Mr. Wall had committed
murder (and was, in effect, a comment on the evidence by the court).
Thus Appellant asserts that when the jury is told, either explicitly or implicitly,
that Mr. Wall has committed murder, the jury would conclude that his belief that Zach

Appellant asserts that awareness of the fact that someone is alive is required for implied
malice, which is more clearly stated in the revised instruction adopted after our case.
Current ICJI 703 provides as follows in relevant part:
Malice is implied when:
1. The killing resulted from an intentional act,
2. The natural consequences of the act are dangerous to human life, and
3. The act was deliberately performed with knowledge of the danger to,
and with conscious disregard for, human life.

was dead did not matter and was not a defense. It would thus follow to the jury that if it
was not a defense for (second degree) murder, it likewise would not have been for first
degree murder. In other words, while the jury may have acquitted Mr. Wall of (second
degree) murder, once it was told that he had committed murder, it would simply convict
him of first degree murder as well.
Or, the new transitional verdict form may have acted like a prohibited dynamite
instruction, which is suggested from the suspect timing of events. The jury deliberated
for 11 hours and 15 minutes with a transitional verdict form consistent with the elements
instruction and which required them to first decide whether Mr. Wall was guilty of
(second degree) murder and if so, whether he is guilty of first degree murder. Then the
jury is given a new transitional verdict form which contradicts the elements instructions
and instead requires them to first decide whether he is guilty of first degree murder. The
jury is given the new verdict form at 11 :25 AM and told to keep deliberating, and then
the court reconvenes at 1:40 PM to take the guilty verdict for first degree murder. (R. p.
446.)
So in other words, after long deliberation, the jury is told to change what it had
been doing and first decide whether Mr. Wall committed first degree murder contrary to
the elements instructions and the verdict form which it had but was taken away. Then,
not surprisingly, it finds him guilty of that crime relatively quickly (when the intervening
lunchtime is considered). Many scenarios as to what happened are possible, with one
being that the jury had decided that Mr. Wall's belief that Zach was dead was not a
defenseto (second degree) murder but may be to first degree murder, and the new
verdict form then changed the jurors' minds (or forced a break in a deadlock over it).

Or perhaps the problems with the instructional error manifested themselves in
other ways, for example, the jury might have decided that if the new verdict form was
contrary to the other instructions, that it really did not have to follow some other
instructions either. Further, it very well could have been a combination of the problems
discussed which resulted in the guilty verdict.
Of course, precise knowledge of just what happened is not the test, rather, it is
whether this Court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict would have
been the same without the error(s). Since, as explained above, there is evidence (and
defenses) which could rationally lead to Mr. Wall's acquittal on the charge of first andlor
second degree murder, in addition to the fact that he was actually acquitted of conspiracy
to commit first degree murder, it cannot be said that the guilty verdict was surely
unattributable to the error and thus it is not harmless.

CONCLUSION
For all the reasons as stated above, Appellant requests tha
convictions and remand this matter for a new trial.
.. (i"'
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